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DOUGLAS ANALYSIS AT THE SUMMARY
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Ari B. Solotoff*
I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2003, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court has applied the Supreme
Court’s McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis on summary judgment in
employment discrimination claims brought under Maine law.1 Recently, however,
some justices of the Law Court have questioned McDonnell Douglas’s continuing
application to summary judgment determinations. They argue that the framework
is outdated, overly mechanical, and unnecessary.2 In Trott v. H.D. Goodall
Hospital,3 the court set forth three guiding principles for lawyers and judges to
follow in employment discrimination cases facing disposition at summary
judgment.4 In doing so, the court signaled that McDonnell Douglas should
continue to be applied at summary judgment because the analysis is a valuable and
necessary interpretive device for defining the substantive law of intentional
discrimination.5 The court’s synthesis of the principles governing summary
judgment decisions in employment discrimination cases also sharpened the analysis
for contemporary use. Thus, Maine courts need not discontinue use of McDonnell
Douglas and should continue to apply it at summary judgment.
Claire Trott served as a nurse at H.D. Goodall Hospital for close to twenty
years.6 Following the termination of her employment from the Hospital in 2009,
Trott complained that she was discharged in violation of Maine’s Whistleblower
Protection Act (WPA) and because of her participation in a deposition for a
wrongful death suit brought against the Hospital.7 Pursuant to the Act,8 Trott
* J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maine School of Law. The author wishes to thank
Professors Dmitry Bam and Melvyn Zarr for their invaluable feedback and guidance on this Note. In
addition to his family and friends, the author is deeply appreciative of his colleagues on the Maine Law
Review for their ongoing assistance and support. This Note is dedicated to the memory of Lawrence
Solotoff (1945-2014), civil rights attorney and co-author of the treatise SEX DISCRIMINATION AND
SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE WORK PLACE (Law Journal Press 2014).
1. See infra note 87 and accompanying text.
2. See infra Part III.E.
3. 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7.
4. See infra Part III.D.
5. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (holding that submission of a
factual dispute to the jury must be guided by the applicable substantive evidentiary standards).
6. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 1, Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7 (No.
YOR-12-213).
7. Id.
8. The statute provides in relevant part: “No employer may discharge, threaten or otherwise
discriminate against an employee regarding the employee’s compensation, terms, conditions, location or
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submitted a complaint to the Maine Human Rights Commission, alleging that the
Hospital severed her employment in retaliation for the deposition testimony she
provided as part of the wrongful death suit.9 The Hospital contended that it
discharged Trott for falsification of a medical record in violation of Hospital
policy.10 The Superior Court granted summary judgment to the Hospital,
concluding that Trott failed to produce evidence showing a causal link between her
discharge and her participation in the deposition as required by the statute.11
In Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hospital, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as
the Law Court, reversed the grant of summary judgment to the Hospital.12 The
case involved a claim of employment discrimination and the court applied the
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting analysis to the causation element of the
WPA.13 Under McDonnell Douglas, a plaintiff bears the initial burden of
establishing a “prima facie case” that unlawful discrimination motivated the
employee’s discharge.14 After the employee meets this initial burden, the employer
must produce evidence of a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the adverse
action.15 If the employer does not produce an explanation, or if the employee
demonstrates that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual, then the employee has
made out a “prima facie case” in the more general sense, and has met the
employee’s burden of production on all the elements of a claim for
discrimination.16 Evidence of pretext, therefore, is crucial for the plaintiff to
survive summary judgment.
Under the WPA, an employee must prove three elements to prevail on a
discrimination claim: (1) the employee was asked to participate in a court action;
(2) the employee was subject to an adverse employment action; and (3) there was a
“causal link” between the protected activity and the adverse action.17 The Hospital
conceded that Trott’s discharge was an adverse employment action.18 The Law
Court further concluded that Trott’s deposition testimony was a “court action”
within the meaning of the WPA.19 The question for the court was whether Trott
had met her burden of production on the issue of causation.20 As a matter of
substantive law interpretation of the WPA, the court applied the three-step burdenprivileges of employment because . . . [t]he employee is requested to participate in an investigation,
hearing or . . . a court action.” 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(C) (2013).
9. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 7.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id. ¶ 26.
13. Id. ¶ 15.
14. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). See Denny Chin & Jodi
Golinsky, Moving Beyond McDonnell Douglas: A Simplified Method for Assessing Evidence in
Discrimination Cases, 64 BROOK. L. REV. 659, 663-64 (1998) (discussing the four specific elements of
the plaintiff’s prima facie case as they have evolved in the Second Circuit, as well as some of the
confusion that has arisen regarding the elements).
15. Id.
16. Id. at 804.
17. See 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621 (2013); 26 M.R.S.A. § 833(1)(C) (2013). See also Costain
v. Sunbury Primary Care, P.A., 2008 ME 142, ¶ 6, 954 A.2d 1051.
18. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 11, 66 A.3d 7.
19. Id. ¶ 12.
20. Id. ¶ 14.
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shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas and concluded that Trott had met her
burden of production.21 The court then vacated the decision and remanded, holding
that when viewing the summary judgment record from the “full range of reasonable
perceptions . . . a reasonable juror could conclude that the Hospital’s articulated
reason for discharging her was” pretextual,22 and that Trott was entitled to have her
claim heard by a jury.23
Two justices of the Law Court concurred in the result, but contended, as they
had done a year earlier in another case,24 that Maine courts should no longer apply
McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment in employment discrimination cases.25
The concurring opinion can be read either as disagreeing with the meaning or
interpretation of the state substantive law when analyzing the causation element of
a WPA claim, or as disagreeing with application of that substantive law at the
summary judgment stage. The latter reading of the concurring justices in Trott
follows from their stance as articulated in Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care
Facility26: applying McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment merely confuses the
ultimate issue of whether there is evidence of employment discrimination.27
Questioning the “continued vitality of the burden-shifting analysis,”28 the
concurrence reasserted that courts should return to the “straightforward and
objective inquiry pursuant to Rule 56.”29
Thus, courts in Maine were left with an open question of whether to continue
to apply the Supreme Court’s burden-shifting analysis as articulated in McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green,30 when deciding a motion for summary judgment in an
employment discrimination case brought under state law.31 The question of the
continuing vitality of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in employment
discrimination cases at summary judgment is neither new,32 nor unique to Maine.33

21. Id. ¶ 15.
22. Id. ¶ 25
23. Id. ¶ 26.
24. See Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver,
J., concurring).
25. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring).
26. 2012 ME 80, 45 A.3d 722. Although Justice Alexander joined the concurring opinion in
Daniels, he was a member of the majority opinion in Trott.
27. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring). See also Fuhrmann v. Staples
the Office Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶ 13, 58 A.3d 1083 (acknowledging Justice Silver’s
questioning of the application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to employment discrimination cases
at the summary judgment stage).
28. Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring).
29. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 34, 45 A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring).
30. 411 U.S. 792, 802-05 (1973).
31. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring); Daniels, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45
A.3d 722 (Silver, J., concurring) (stating that the analysis is “outdated, confusing, and unworkable”).
32. See Martin J. Katz, Reclaiming McDonnell Douglas, 83 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 109, 113 n.15
(2007) (citing numerous longstanding criticisms of the analysis). See also William R. Corbett,
McDonnell Douglas, 1973-2003: May You Rest in Peace?, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 199, 202 n.15
(2003) (noting that many scholars and employee rights advocates have called for abandonment of the
analysis).
33. See Christopher J. Emden, Note, Subverting Rule 56? McDonnell Douglas, White v. Baxter
Healthcare Corp., and the Mess of Summary Judgment in Mixed-Motive Cases, 1 WM. & MARY BUS. L.
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At the same time, the issue of the remaining utility of the McDonnell Douglas
analysis stands on the cutting edge of employment discrimination practice,
especially for cases facing disposition at summary judgment.34 Because summary
judgment is granted more frequently in employment discrimination cases as
compared with other civil suits,35 the stakes for both employees and employers are
high.36
Contrary to the concurrence’s reading of Trott, reasoning from first principles
of summary judgment makes clear that it would be inconsistent to apply one
interpretation of the substantive law at summary judgment and a different
interpretation at trial.37 Courts have routinely applied the burden-shifting
framework at summary judgment as a technique to guide the complexities of the
record38 and the allocation of proof in employment discrimination cases.39 As
originally envisioned by the Supreme Court, the analysis was designed to “frame
the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff will have a full and fair
opportunity to demonstrate pretext” before the fact-finder at trial.40 Thus, the
plaintiff’s rebuttal case on the issue of pretext constitutes an essential and necessary
component of intentional discrimination substantive law.41
This Note will proceed in three parts. Part II will review the McDonnell
Douglas analytical framework and its evolution. After briefly touching on
summary judgment determinations in Maine, Part II will then explore the use of the
REV. 139, 154 (2010) (noting that the Baxter court’s decision that McDonnell Douglas does not apply to
summary judgment “creates an official circuit split” for federal courts).
34. See Denny Chin, Summary Judgment in Employment Discrimination Cases: A Judge’s
Perspective, 57 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 671, 681 (2013) (suggesting that the McDonnell Douglas analysis
is no longer helpful to anyone given the evolution of employment law).
35. See id. at 672-73 (citing a recent Federal Judicial Center study of civil cases).
36. See Ann C. McGinley, Credulous Courts and the Tortured Trilogy: The Improper Use of
Summary Judgment in Title VII and ADEA Cases, 34 B.C. L. REV. 203, 221 n.68 (1993) (stating that the
motion for “summary judgment has emerged as the predominant battleground for employers seeking to
avoid discrimination trials.” (internal citations omitted)).
37. See Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986). For example, in considering
the application of McDonnell Douglas to jury instructions in a case with “inferences that are to be
derived from the underpinnings of the McDonnell Douglas-type prima facie case,” the 1st Circuit has
stated that “[t]he jury should be told that, if it finds all the disputed elements and that the defendant’s
reason is a pretext, it would be warranted in finding for the plaintiff on the ultimate issue of . . .
discrimination.” Loeb v. Textron, Inc. 600 F.2d 1003, 1018 (1979). However, the 1st Circuit also
acknowledged that “it is obvious that most cases will not come neatly packaged” in a pure McDonnell
Douglas structure and that a “court should not force a case into a McDonnell Douglas format if it will
merely divert the jury from the real issues.” Id.
38. See Chin, supra note 34, at 675 (noting the difficulty of employment discrimination cases,
which involve many discovery disputes, pro se litigants, and sometimes uneven lawyering, as well as
“burdensome, time-consuming summary judgment motions with extensive records.”).
39. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 221 (stating the courts have “uniformly applied the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine approach to summary judgment); William R. Corbett, Of Babies, Bathwater, and
Throwing Out Proof Structures: It is Not Time to Jettison McDonnell Douglas, 2 EMP. RTS. & EMP.
POL’Y J. 361, 380 (1998) (stating that the McDonnell Douglas proof structure has played an important
role for courts in evaluating challenges to sufficiency of the evidence).
40. Tex. Dept. of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255-56 (1981).
41. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 256 (concluding that the Supreme Court shaped the McDonnell
Douglas/Burdine formula to make it easier for plaintiffs to prove discrimination, primarily because
employers rarely leave behind incriminating direct evidence).
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McDonnell Douglas analysis in Maine’s employment discrimination cases facing
disposition at summary judgment. Part III will examine the Trott decision and the
concurring opinion. Part IV will assess the Law Court’s rationale and the
concurrence in light of the purposes behind the McDonnell Douglas framework.
After examining broader criticisms of the framework, this Note ultimately
concludes that Maine courts should continue to apply the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, as well as the Trott principles, in employment discrimination cases at the
summary judgment stage.
II. THE MCDONNELL DOUGLAS ANALYSIS IN MAINE’S EMPLOYMENT
DISCRIMINATION CASES
A. The Burden-Shifting Framework of McDonnell Douglas
Forty years ago, in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, the Supreme Court
introduced the standard analysis for individual claims of disparate treatment
brought under the Civil Rights Act of 1964.42 Title VII of the Act prohibits
employers from discriminating against individuals in the terms and conditions of
employment on the basis of “race, color, religion, sex or national origin.”43 Thus,
in a disparate treatment case, an employer treats some people differently than
others because of a protected characteristic.44 In McDonnell Douglas, the critical
issue before the Court was the order and allocation of proof in employment
discrimination suits brought by private individuals against their employers.45
Although several methods have evolved for proving disparate treatment by an
employer against an employee,46 the Supreme Court designed the McDonnell
Douglas proof structure in order to spotlight the circumstantial evidence of an
employee alleging employment discrimination, especially when the employee lacks
access to direct evidence of an employer’s discriminatory intent.47
The Supreme Court did not mandate use of the McDonnell Douglas analysis.48
However, it was the only method of proof for nearly ten years after the case was
decided.49 The McDonnell Douglas analysis has become the predominant method

42. The Supreme Court underscored the Act’s purpose in saying, “[t]he broad, overriding interest,
shared by employer, employee, and consumer, is efficient and trustworthy workmanship assured
through fair and racially neutral employment and personnel decisions.” McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792, 801 (1973).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (2012).
44. See Int’l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15 (1977) (distinguishing
disparate treatment from disparate impact).
45. See McDonnell Douglas Corp., 411 U.S. at 800.
46. For a review of other methods of proving disparate treatment, including direct evidence and
mixed-motives, see Miles F. Archer, Mullin v. Raytheon Company: The Threatened Vitality of
Disparate Impact Under the ADEA, 52 ME. L. REV. 149, 154-56 (2000).
47. See Corbett, supra note 39, at 363 (noting the evidentiary difficulties of inquiries into an
employer’s state of mind).
48. See Katz, supra note 32, at 117 (stating that the Supreme Court’s opinion in McDonnell
Douglas did not include any discussion of whether the analysis was mandatory).
49. See id.
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for analyzing claims of intentional employment discrimination.50 The Supreme
Court shaped the burden-shifting analysis with the trial process in mind, providing
plaintiffs with an opportunity to present a rebuttal case to the jury, focusing
substantially on the question of the legitimacy of the defendant’s asserted reasons
for the adverse employment action.51
The Supreme Court has refined the McDonnell Douglas analysis in later
cases.52 In Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,53 the Court
clarified that only the burden of production shifts to the defendant at the second
step, and the “ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant
intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the
plaintiff.”54 In St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks,55 the Court held that when a
plaintiff discredits an employer’s articulated reason for the adverse employment
action, it may permit the fact-finder to infer discriminatory intent.56 And although
a plaintiff is not required to present additional evidence of discrimination beyond
meeting the elements of the prima facie case, rejection of the employer’s proffered
reason does not guarantee judgment for the plaintiff on the ultimate issue of
discrimination.57 However, in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.,58 the
Court clarified that additional independent evidence of discrimination is not
required and that a plaintiff’s prima facie case, together with sufficient evidence to
show that the employer’s articulated reason is false, would permit a finding of
discrimination.59
Causation is a central requirement of proof in any disparate treatment claim.60
The McDonnell Douglas analysis directs the plaintiff to show causation by
requiring a demonstration of “pretext.”61 The causation analysis relies on a set of
successive inferences.62 The focus on pretext is an application of “the general
principle of evidence law that the factfinder is entitled to consider a party’s
dishonesty about a material fact as affirmative evidence of guilt.”63 A plaintiff’s
50. Corbett, supra note 39, at 363. See also Lawrence D. Rosenthal, Motions for Summary
Judgment When Employers Offer Multiple Justifications for Adverse Employment Actions: Why the
Exceptions Should Swallow the Rule, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 335, 336 (2002) (noting that the unanimous
Supreme Court opinions in McDonnell Douglas and Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S.
248 (1981), represent the “most commonly applied framework for litigating an employment
discrimination lawsuit”).
51. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 220-21.
52. For a detailed description of the evolution of McDonnell Douglas in subsequent Supreme Court
decisions, see Michael J. Zimmer, The New Discrimination Law: Price Waterhouse is Dead, Wither
McDonnell Douglas?, 53 EMORY L.J. 1887, 1892-1903 (2004).
53. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
54. Id. at 253.
55. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
56. Id. at 511.
57. See id.
58. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
59. Id. at 148-49.
60. See Katz, supra note 32, at 121 (stating that a plaintiff must show that the adverse action
occurred “because of” a protected characteristic).
61. See McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804 (1973).
62. See Katz, supra note 32, at 130 (describing the chain of inference as moving from “error, to lie,
to cover-up, to discrimination”).
63. Reeves, 530 U.S. at 147 (internal citations omitted).
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attempts to prove causation in an employment discrimination case can be especially
difficult,64 and can be shown in one of two ways: “but for” or “motivating factor”
causation.65 Thus, the effect of the McDonnell Douglas framework is to provide an
individual bringing suit against an employer with a target, or something to aim at in
order to “smoke”66 out an employer’s unlawful act.67
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed the application of
McDonnell Douglas to a motion for summary judgment, the Court provided some
guidance on the question in Reeves, concerning determinations of sufficiency of the
evidence and motions for judgment as a matter of law.68 There, the Court indicated
that considerations of the evidence on a Rule 50 motion should adhere to the
following principles: the court should review all the evidence in the record, as
opposed to just the reasonable inferences favoring the nonmoving party;69 the court
“must draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party, and it may
not make credibility determinations or weigh the evidence;”70 and because
credibility determinations and weighing the evidence are functions of the jury, the
court should “give credence to the evidence favoring the nonmovant as well as that
‘evidence supporting the moving party that is uncontradicted and unimpeached.’”71
B. Summary Judgment in Maine
Summary judgment law in Maine is well-established. “Summary judgment is
appropriate when the portions of the record referenced in the statements of material
fact disclose no genuine issues of material fact and reveal that one party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.”72 A factual dispute is material if it could impact
the outcome of the suit.73 Absent a factual dispute, there is no need for trial.74

64. See Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 255 n.8 (1981) (“[T]he allocation of
burdens and the creation of a presumption by the establishment of a prima facie case is intended
progressively to sharpen the inquiry into the elusive factual question of intentional discrimination.”).
Indeed, “the entire purpose of the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case is to compensate for the fact that
direct evidence of intentional discrimination is hard to come by.” Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490
U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
65. See Katz, supra note 32, at 122 (noting that “a factor is a ‘motivating factor’ where it has some
causal influence but does not rise to the level of ‘but for’”). Although inapplicable to this case, with
respect to claims of retaliation brought under federal law, the Supreme Court recently held that a
plaintiff “must establish that his or her protected activity was a but-for cause of the alleged adverse
action by the employer.” Univ. of Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517, 2534 (2013). In
Nassar, the Court distinguished “status-based discrimination” from “employer retaliation” on account of
protected activity and concluded that for textual and structural reasons, Title VII’s lessened causation
standard under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(m) applies only to claims of the former type. See id. at 2533.
66. See Price Waterhouse, 490 U.S. at 266 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (requiring an employer to
demonstrate at the second step of the analysis that “despite the smoke, there is no fire”).
67. See Katz, supra note 32, at 124-25 (describing the “target” analogy).
68. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 150 (2000) (noting that the
standards for granting summary judgment mirror the standards for granting judgment as a matter of
law).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 151.
72. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c); Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶ 11, 915 A.2d 400.
73. Arrow Fastener Co. v. Wrabacon, 2007 ME 34, ¶ 15, 917 A.2d 123.
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Furthermore, “evidentiary inferences based on credibility or weight are
impermissible.”75 In short, summary judgment in Maine is only available in “those
instances where the facts properly proffered would be flatly insufficient to support
a judgment in favor of the nonmoving party as a matter of law.”76
C. Application of McDonnell Douglas to Maine’s Employment Discrimination
Cases Facing Disposition at Summary Judgment
With the purpose of preventing “discrimination in employment, housing or
access to public accommodations on account of race, color, religion, ancestry or
national origin,”77 the Maine Legislature enacted the Maine Human Rights Act in
1971, following enactment of federal antidiscrimination statutes and corresponding
case law interpreting those statutes.78 By adopting safeguards in conformity with
federal antidiscrimination statutes, the Maine Legislature intended courts to
reference federal case law to “provide significant guidance in the construction of
[the] statute.”79
The Law Court first applied the McDonnell Douglas framework in Maine
Human Rights Commission v. City of Auburn,80 a case concerning two female
applicants for police officer positions with the City of Auburn.81 Alleging sex
discrimination in violation of the Maine Human Rights Act,82 the Law Court
reviewed judgment for the defendant post-trial. In an extensive opinion, Chief
Justice McKusick articulated the unique method by which courts in Maine should
evaluate employment discrimination evidence after trial, especially in light of
federal legislation and case law.83 The Law Court identified the Supreme Court’s
McDonnell Douglas opinion as the primary source of a “special methodology” by
which courts should evaluate evidence in disparate treatment employment
discrimination cases.84 The Law Court held that judges should apply the “threestage” framework85 “to the whole evidence presented by the parties” as the “proper
method for evaluating the evidence presented at trial for cases arising under the
74. See Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 19, 864 A.2d 169 (“A cornerstone of
the rationale for having a summary judgment process is that a trial is not warranted if a party cannot
identify admissible evidence that establishes an actual factual dispute.”).
75. Arrow Fastener Co., 2007 ME 34, ¶ 16, 917 A.2d 123 (citation omitted).
76. Id. ¶ 18.
77. P.L. 1971, ch. 501, § 1 (codified as amended at 5 M.R.S.A. § 4592 (1973)).
78. See Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1261 (Me. 1979).
79. Id. (citations omitted).
80. Id.
81. Id. at 1257.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1261. See id. at 1262 n.13 (cautioning that the evaluation method discussed by the court
does not concern “the order of evidence at trial or trial tactics,” but rather is a tool by which judges
evaluate “after the trial is over . . . all the evidence to determine whether unlawful discrimination has
been proved.”).
84. Id. at 1261.
85. See id. at 1262 (stating that the burden of persuasion remains at all times with the plaintiff, who
may assist the judge in rejecting the employer’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason “by offering
affirmative evidence of pretext or by the strength of the inference of discrimination arising from the
plaintiff’s prima facie case,” and that the judge’s own credibility assessment of witnesses may justify
rejection of the employer’s reason).
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Maine Human Rights Act.”86
The Law Court’s first application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis to
review of a motion for summary judgment in an employment discrimination case
appeared in the 2003 case of Doyle v. Department of Human Services.87 An
employee for the State of Maine, Doyle asserted claims of discrimination,
retaliation, and hostile work environment under the Maine Human Rights Act,88
following her surgery and return to work.89 Doyle argued that DHS discriminated
against her by failing to provide reasonable accommodations for her medical
condition and then retaliated against her by subjecting her to a hostile work
environment because of her complaints and requests for assistance.90 On her
claims of discrimination and retaliation, the Law Court held that DHS was entitled
to summary judgment because Doyle failed to generate an issue of material fact
that the reasons given for her termination were pretextual.91
The Law Court has since applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis at the
summary judgment stage in six cases.92 The Law Court has stated that in order to
survive a defense motion for summary judgment under the McDonnell Douglas
analysis, plaintiffs must “establish[] a factual dispute as to whether a causal
connection exists” between protected activity and an adverse employment action.93
In addition, a claim for employment discrimination will not survive summary
judgment if a plaintiff “relies on mere ‘conclusory allegations, improbable
inferences, and unsupported speculation.’”94 Instead, a plaintiff must “assert
sufficient facts, supported in the summary judgment record, from which a
86. Id. at 1268.
87. 2003 ME 61, ¶¶ 14-15, 824 A.2d 48.
88. 5 M.R.S.A. §§ 4551-4634 (2013).
89. Doyle v. Dep’t of Human Servs., 2003 ME 61, ¶ 7, 824 A.2d 48.
90. Id.
91. Id. ¶¶ 18, 22. The court also held that the trial court properly granted summary judgment
because Doyle failed to comply with the requirements of Rule 56(h)(2). See id. ¶ 13.
92. See Fuhrmann v. Staples the Office Superstore E., Inc., 2012 ME 135, ¶¶ 13, 21, 58 A.3d 1083
(holding that in its entirety, Fuhrmann produced sufficient evidence showing weaknesses and
inconsistencies in the legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons offered by Staples so as to generate an issue
of fact, thereby precluding summary judgment); Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012
ME 80, ¶¶ 14, 22, 45 A.2d 80 (holding that “even if one party’s version of events appears more credible
and persuasive to the court, the competing inferences” drawn from temporal proximity of the adverse
action created a triable issue on the retaliation claim, thereby precluding summary judgment); Cookson
v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶¶ 15, 25, 974 A.2d 276 (holding that summary judgment was
inappropriate because Cookson produced sufficient evidence for a fact-finder to reasonably conclude
that the school district’s decision was not based on Cookson’s conduct, but instead motivated by
discrimination); Currie v. Indus. Sec., Inc., 2007 ME 12, ¶¶ 13, 28, 915 A.2d 400 (holding that there
was sufficient temporal proximity between protected activity and discharge, as well as additional
evidence of causation to preclude the grant of summary judgment); LePage v. Bath Iron Works Corp.,
2006 ME 130, ¶¶ 19, 25, 909 A.2d 629 (holding that LePage failed to make out a prima facie case
because he did not suffer from an adverse employment action); Stanley v. Hancock Cnty. Comm’rs,
2004 ME 157, ¶¶ 12, 26, 864 A.2d 169 (holding that the summary judgment record failed to establish a
genuine issue of disputed fact on the issue of causation under the WPA claim when Stanley failed to
contradict in his statement of material facts that his poor performance was not the reason for his
discharge).
93. Stanley, 2004 ME 157, ¶ 24, 864 A.2d 169.
94. Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 22, 974 A.2d 276 (quoting Feliciano de la Cruz v. El Conquistador
Resort & Country Club, 218 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 2000)).
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reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve the employer’s proffered rationale and
conclude that illegal discrimination was the true motivating factor.”95 The court
has also stated that a plaintiff can meet his or her burden of production by
presenting affirmative evidence of “weaknesses, implausibilities, inconsistencies,
incoherencies, or contradictions in the employer’s proffered reasons for its action
that a reasonable factfinder could rationally find them unworthy of credence and . .
. infer that the employer did not act for the asserted non-discriminatory reasons.”96
III. TROTT V. H.D. GOODALL HOSPITAL
A. Factual Background
H.D. Goodall Hospital, a not-for-profit hospital located in Sanford, Maine,
employed Claire Trott as a nurse from 1989 until March 2009,97 when the Hospital
terminated Trott’s employment.98 In December 2007, a patient died during Trott’s
shift,99 and Trott subsequently spoke with the deceased patient’s daughter,
speculating as to potential causes of death including a possible morphine
overdose.100 Soon thereafter, the patient’s estate initiated a wrongful death suit
against the Hospital.101
Between 1998 and 2007, the Hospital’s performance evaluations of Trott were
consistently positive.102 In 2007, and just prior to the patient’s death, the Hospital
installed a new computer system to maintain patient records; the system was
complex and nurses had difficulty navigating and using the new software.103 One
year later, in October 2008, the Hospital gave Trott a 1.5% raise after a positive
performance evaluation, but she was advised that she needed improvement in the
areas of patient assessment and medication documentation.104 Trott achieved the
necessary improvement in the areas specified and the Hospital awarded Trott an
additional 1.5% raise in January 2009.105 One month later, Trott participated in a
deposition in connection with the wrongful death suit.106 In preparation for the
deposition, the Hospital’s attorney indicated to Trott that she was to blame for the
wrongful death suit against the Hospital because Trott suggested to the patient’s
family that a morphine overdose was a possible cause of death.107
The plaintiff’s attorney took Trott’s deposition testimony concerning her
observations of the patient prior to his death, as well as the associated entries that
95. Cookson, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 23, 974 A.2d 276.
96. Id. ¶ 17 (quoting Billings v. Town of Grafton, 515 F.3d 39, 55-56 (1st Cir. 2008)).
97. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 1.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 7.
100. Id.
101. Brief of Defendant-Appellee at 3, Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, 66 A.3d 7 (No.
YOR-12-213).
102. Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 1-3.
103. Id. at 3-4. See also id. at 19 (indicating that the software included a feature which allowed the
automatic recall of prior patient assessments for use as current assessments).
104. Id. at 8.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 8-9.
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Trott made in the computer medical record to reflect the patient’s status.108 Trott
was not shown any of the patient’s charts prior to her deposition testimony.109 The
attorney proceeded to elicit testimony from Trott that conflicted with the patient’s
record: Trott testified that the patient was asleep,110 whereas the plaintiff’s attorney
pointed out that the medical record indicated that the patient was “alert, oriented
times three” and had an “unsteady gait.”111 When asked to explain the discrepancy
between her visual observation and the computer entry, Trott testified that “this
electronic thing is new to me . . . I don’t know how to explain it.”112 Trott further
testified that the computer entry was not based on a contemporaneous observation
of the patient, but that she had been relying on her recent memory of the patient
from church when she entered the information into the computer.113 Although a
few Hospital administrators indicated to Trott that they knew she had not made the
erroneous entries on purpose,114 Trott was discharged from her employment with
the Hospital on March 26, 2009, the day after she reviewed and signed her
deposition transcript.115
The Hospital sent Trott a letter formally terminating her employment on the
grounds that the medical record entry Trott described in her deposition constituted
a falsification of a patient medical record which is a terminable offense within the
meaning of the Hospital’s Conduct and Discipline policy.116 A subsequent letter to
the state nursing board, required by law, cited additional grounds for discharge,
including the same issues identified in Trott’s most recent performance evaluation:
the need for improvement in documentation and medication administration.117
B. Procedural History
Trott filed a complaint against the Hospital alleging that, when the Hospital
discharged her as a result of her deposition testimony in the wrongful death lawsuit,
it violated the Whistleblower Protection Act.118 The Hospital moved for summary
judgment, asserting no dispute regarding the fact that it discharged Trott because of
her allegedly undisputed deposition testimony evidencing the fact that she falsified
a patient’s medical record.119 The Hospital further argued that Trott presented no
evidence of pretext.120 Trott opposed the motion and asserted that a jury could
108. Id. at 9.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 4.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 12 (noting that Trott testified that Hospital staff
told Trott that she did not falsify the medical record).
115. Id. at 12.
116. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 8; see also id. at 3 (describing the fact that
“recording of false information is classified as a ‘major breach’ of Goodall policy” and grounds for
termination).
117. See id. at 9 (identifying “patient assessment, reassessment, clinical judgment, and
documentation” as grounds for discharge).
118. See Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 9.
119. Id. at 11.
120. Id.
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reasonably conclude that either a software glitch caused the errors in the patient’s
record or that Trott simply entered the wrong information.121 The Superior Court
granted summary judgment because it concluded that Trott failed to carry her
burden to produce evidence that the Hospital discharged her because she
participated in the deposition and suit against the Hospital.122 Trott appealed.123
C. Arguments on Appeal
Trott argued on appeal that the Hospital’s claim that she falsified a medical
record served as pretext to terminate her employment in retaliation for the
deposition testimony she gave in the wrongful death suit.124 Trott further alleged
that the reason behind the improper medical record entry may have been that she
mistakenly entered the wrong information into the computer,125 and that there was
sufficient evidence to show that the computer medical record system was error
prone.126 Trott also contended that because counsel for the Hospital did not review
the deceased patient’s medical records with her prior to her deposition, she became
flustered during questioning and offered conflicting reasons for the discrepancy.127
Furthermore, Trott asserted that because the adverse employment action occurred
in close proximity to conduct protected under the statute, the burden shifted to the
Hospital to show a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the discharge.128
Finally, Trott argued that there was sufficient evidence of pretext: the medical
record falsification reason produced by the Hospital was weak; the Hospital offered
contradictory reasons for discharge on appeal as compared with its letter to the
state nursing board; the Hospital’s treatment of Trott was inconsistent with that of
other nurses on staff; and the Hospital exhibited animus towards Trott.129
The Hospital argued, in contrast, that it terminated Trott’s employment as a
result of her admissions made during the wrongful death suit deposition, and more
specifically, that Trott entered “information into a patient’s medical record without
actually assessing the patient in the hospital.”130 The Hospital contended that there
was no factual dispute concerning the substance of Trott’s deposition testimony
and that the actions she admitted to as part of the deposition constituted a violation
of Hospital policy, thereby supporting grounds for termination.131 Finally, the
Hospital argued that Trott had conceded on appeal the legitimacy of the Hospital’s
non-retaliatory reason and waived any further challenge to the sufficiency of the
121. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 19. However, the Hospital’s policy did not
distinguish between a recording error and an intentional falsification of a medical record. See Brief of
Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 3.
122. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 10, 66 A.3d 7.
123. Id.
124. See Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, supra note 6, at 14.
125. Id. at 10.
126. Id. at 19.
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id. at 15.
129. Id. at 21-24. Trott asserted that on appeal, the Hospital did not include the additional reasons
for discharge (poor documentation and medication administration) which it had asserted to the State
Board of Nursing, suggesting further evidence of pretext. See id. at 23.
130. Brief of Defendant-Appellee, supra note 101, at 16.
131. Id.
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Hospital’s evidence by failing to dispute the Hospital’s rationale in her
memorandum of law in opposition to the Hospital’s motion for summary
judgment.132 For these reasons, the Hospital asserted that the only issue on appeal
was whether there were genuine issues of material fact concerning pretext,133 and
that summary judgment was properly granted because Trott failed to produce
evidence that the Hospital based its decision on Trott’s participation in the
wrongful death suit as opposed to her admissions made within the deposition
itself.134
D. Decision of the Law Court
The Maine Human Rights Act provides an employee with a cause of action
against an employer for discrimination resulting from an employee’s participation
in a court action.135 Writing for the majority, Justice Levy concluded that summary
judgment had been granted in error because Trott met her burden of production for
each element of her claim, and further established a genuine issue of material fact
as to the existence of a “causal link” between her WPA protected activity and her
discharge.136
Invoking the analysis used in prior employment discrimination cases, the court
applied the three-step McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to evaluate
“whether Trott presented sufficient evidence to withstand summary judgment . . .
.”137 Citing the “temporal nexus” analysis of Watt v. UniFirst Corp.,138 the court
concluded that Trott met her initial burden of showing a prima facie case of
discrimination: Trott produced evidence that the Hospital discharged her forty-one
days after she participated in the deposition, and one day after she signed her
deposition.139 Pointing to the noncontemporaneous observations of the patient that
Trott used to make the computer medical record entry, as well as evidence that
making such an entry constituted falsification of a medical record and a terminable
offense, the court concluded that the Hospital met its burden to produce evidence of
a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for discharging Trott.140 At that point, the
court stated that the burden of production shifted back to Trott to “present evidence
that the Hospital’s stated reason for her discharge—the falsification of records—

132. Id. at 18-19.
133. Id. at 18.
134. Id. at 22. The Hospital further argued that there was no evidence that Trott was treated
differently from other nurses or that the Hospital advanced contradictory reasons for her discharge, and
that the temporal proximity of her discharge and deposition testimony was not evidence of causation
because her admissions of misconduct occurred at the same time as her protected activity. See id. at 2730.
135. See 5 M.R.S. §§ 4572(1)(A), 4621 (2013); 26 M.R.S. § 833(1)(C) (2013). For an in-depth
discussion of the history of the Maine Human Rights Act, see Katherine I. Rand, Taking Care of
Business and Protecting Maine’s Employees: Supervisor Liability for Employment Discrimination
Under the Maine Human Rights Act, 55 ME. L. REV. 427, 442-43 (2003).
136. Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 25, 66 A.3d 7.
137. Id. ¶¶ 14-15.
138. 2009 ME 47, ¶ 33, 969 A.2d 897.
139. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 16, 66 A.3d 7.
140. Id. ¶ 17.
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was a pretext.”141
In order for the case to survive summary judgment, the court noted that it
would have to conclude that “no reasonable fact-finder could find pretext on the
summary judgment record.”142 Trott, therefore, was required to present “sufficient
evidence to raise a genuine issue of fact regarding the employer’s motivation for
the adverse employment action.”143 For there to be a genuine issue of material fact,
the court indicated that the evidence would require “a fact-finder to choose between
competing versions of the truth.”144
The Law Court then articulated three principles to guide lower courts
considering employment discrimination cases on summary judgment: First, the
court noted that “it is a failure of proof, and not the weight that might be assigned
to the proof” that determines the appropriateness of summary judgment.145 Second,
the court noted that direct evidence of discrimination is rarely available in
employment discrimination cases, and that these cases turn on credibility
determinations and circumstantial evidence.146 Credibility determinations, the
court stated, are inappropriate at the summary judgment stage when undisputed
facts are gleaned from a paper record as opposed to live witness testimony.147
Additionally, the court was careful to note that circumstantial evidence can give
rise to competing inferences.148 Third, when evaluating the summary judgment
record, courts should distinguish between a “weak case of pretext” and “no
case.”149 The court went on to state that judges should evaluate an employee’s
proof with an “awareness that reasonable jurors can and often do disagree as to
both the weight and meaning of evidence.”150 Using these principles, the court then
articulated three ways in which a reasonable juror could find the Hospital’s
discharge of Trott to be pretextual.151 When “[v]iewed from the perspective of the
full range of reasonable perceptions of the summary judgment record,” the court
concluded that Trott “established a genuine issue of material fact as to the existence
of a ‘causal link’ between her WPA-protected activity and her discharge,”152 and
that Trott had therefore met her burden of production on all the elements of her
WPA claim.153 The court vacated the judgment and remanded for further
141. Id.
142. Id. ¶ 18.
143. Id.
144. Id. (citation omitted).
145. Id. ¶ 19.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
149. Id. ¶ 20.
150. Id.
151. Id. ¶¶ 22-24 (concluding that a juror could reasonably conclude that Trott’s contradictory
deposition testimony provided a weak basis for the Hospital’s stated belief that Trott falsified a medical
record; that a reasonable juror could conclude that the Hospital believed Trott had made some kind of
negligent error, which would contradict its contention that it discharged Trott for falsifying a record; and
Trott’s receipt of a merit raise just prior to her deposition testimony could lead a reasonable juror to
conclude that the grounds for discharge listed in the letter to the nursing board were evidence of pretext
to “conceal a true, unlawful reason for the discharge”).
152. Id. ¶ 25.
153. Id. ¶ 26.
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proceedings.154
E. The Concurrence
Although concurring in the court’s judgment, Justice Silver wrote separately to
reaffirm the position that courts “should not apply the three-step, burden-shifting
analysis set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green to discrimination claims at
the summary judgment stage.”155 The concurrence first emphasized that weight or
credibility determinations are “inappropriate at the summary judgment stage,” and
that courts must be especially cautious in employment discrimination cases because
“issues of motive and intent are present and turn on circumstantial evidence from
which reasonable jurors could draw competing, plausible inferences.”156 The
concurrence then framed the McDonnell Douglas analysis as “merely a procedural
device that ‘does nothing more than organize the record to determine whether the
plaintiff has offered evidence of causation between the employer’s adverse action
and the employee’s [protected status or activity], and whether the defendant has
offered evidence to put that issue into dispute.’”157
Calling the burden-shifting analysis under McDonnell Douglas a “rigid and
artificial trifurcation of the causation analysis,”158 the concurrence asserted that in
employment discrimination cases, courts need only engage in the straightforward
inquiry provided by the Rules of Civil Procedure: whether the plaintiff has shown a
genuine issue of material fact,159 and whether there exists a prima facie cause of
action.160 The concurrence asserted that the McDonnell Douglas analysis
“confuses rather than clarifies the ultimate issue in employment discrimination
cases: whether there is evidence of discrimination”161 and further questioned the
continued application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis on the basis that it is a
distraction.162
IV. ANALYSIS
The holding in Trott—that summary judgment is inappropriate in employment
discrimination cases in Maine when a plaintiff offers sufficient evidence to show
the presence of a genuine issue of material fact from which a reasonable juror could
find pretext—is justified by the purposes behind the McDonnell Douglas
framework, the line of Maine cases preceding Trott which apply the McDonnell
Douglas analysis at summary judgment, and finally, the familiarity of the analysis
within the common experience of Maine lawyers and judges. Indeed, Trott stands
154. Id.
155. Id. ¶ 28 (Silver, J., concurring).
156. Id. ¶ 27.
157. Id. ¶ 28 (citation omitted).
158. Id.
159. See ME. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
160. Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 29, 66 A.3d 7.
161. Id. ¶ 28 (quoting Daniels v. Narraguagus Bay Health Care Facility, 2012 ME 80, ¶ 29, 45 A.3d
722).
162. See id. (affirming that summary judgment in employment discrimination matters is only
appropriate if “no reasonable juror could conclude that the plaintiff proved her claim of discrimination”
when viewing the record in the light most favorable to the plaintiff).
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for the proposition that when employee-plaintiffs produce some evidence of a
dispute on the issue of pretext, with adequate summary judgment record support,
the case should proceed to trial.163 Thus, the criticisms of McDonnell Douglas as
being impractical and cumbersome cannot overcome the underlying policies and
purposes of the analysis, nor do they support abandoning its application in Maine
employment discrimination cases at summary judgment.
Pretext is the ultimate issue in almost every disparate treatment employment
discrimination case;164 it is the crux of the case.165 Whereas the question of pretext
allows a fact-finder at trial to consider both the credibility of an employer’s
proffered nondiscriminatory reason as well as the evidence educed at trial, the Trott
court correctly distinguished that the summary judgment inquiry only permits a
judge to determine whether the plaintiff has put forward sufficient evidence from
which a reasonable fact-finder could disbelieve an employer’s proffered rationale
and conclude that discrimination motivated the result.166 In the McDonnell
Douglas context, the latter inquiry only appears to be a credibility determination
because the burden of production has most recently shifted from the defendant back
to the plaintiff, suggesting that the plaintiff also holds the burden as the nonmoving
party on the motion for summary judgment.167 Thus, the unusual order and
allocation of proof for employment discrimination cases facing disposition at
summary judgment may serve as one of the primary sources of the general
confusion and criticism.168
As conceived by the Supreme Court, the original purpose of the McDonnell
Douglas analysis was to assist the plaintiff in surfacing the unlawful motivation
that may have prompted an employer’s adverse action.169 Using circumstantial
evidence, the framework permits a fact-finder to draw the inference that an
employer’s reason for discharge is not believable, and therefore, that the employee
was the victim of discrimination.170 Although the inquiry is binary, in that it
presents a yes or no question for the fact-finder concerning the employer’s asserted

163. See Hodgens v. Gen. Dynamics Corp., 144 F.3d 151, 167 (1st Cir. 1998) (stating that “where a
plaintiff in a discrimination case makes out a prima facie case and the issue becomes whether the
employer’s stated nondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination, courts must be ‘particularly
cautious’ about granting the employer’s motion for summary judgment.”).
164. See Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 530 U.S. 133, 153 (2000). See also Chin, supra
note 34, at 679 (stating that the focus of a summary judgment determination should be on the “ultimate
issue” – whether a reasonable jury could find that “more likely than not, the employer’s decision was
motivated at least in part by discrimination”).
165. See Katz, supra note 32, at 125 n.64 (citing commentators who place emphasis on the pretext
prong of the analysis as the focus of the “action”).
166. See Cookson v. Brewer Sch. Dep’t, 2009 ME 57, ¶ 23, 974 A.2d 276.
167. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 241 (“Many courts approaching a summary judgment motion
in a civil rights case . . . require a plaintiff to prove that she was discriminated against.”).
168. See, e.g., Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1221 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J.,
concurring) (distinguishing the burden-shifting analysis from the usual procedure at summary judgment
to “set forth the elements of the plaintiff’s cause of action and then determine whether there is sufficient
evidence for a reasonable person to find that each element has been proved.”).
169. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 215 (stating that the Supreme Court recognized that showing
intent to discriminate is “difficult to prove absent a smoking gun”).
170. See St. Mary’s Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993).
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reason,171 the proof structure was never intended as an inflexible model from which
courts and lawyers should not deviate.172
Despite laudable goals, McDonnell Douglas has many critics.173 The
criticisms of the McDonnell Douglas analysis fall into three categories: First, some
critics argue that the analysis only functions where an employer’s reason is false or
was driven by conscious discrimination.174 Second, others assert that the
framework is a distracting and formalistic procedural overlay that encourages
lawyers and judges to compartmentalize evidence at the expense of the big
picture.175 And third, critics suggest that the analysis operates as a waste of time,176
while promoting judicial error and poor lawyering.177
In light of these criticisms, the concurrence in Trott argues that continued
application of the McDonnell Douglas analysis in Maine’s employment
discrimination cases at summary judgment has the procedural consequence of
encouraging juries, lawyers, and judges to take their eye off of the ball.178 The
critique is that the framework takes the focus off of the ultimate issue, and instead,
places it on the “ping pong-like match”179 of shifting burdens.180 There is support
for the concurrence’s argument that what began as a method of proof to assure
plaintiffs their day in court,181 has evolved into a cumbersome eight-part
framework.182
Reversion to a “standard” Rule 56 inquiry would be inconsistent with the goal
of eliminating workplace discrimination.183 A court’s use of such an analysis, as
171. See Zimmer, supra note 52, at 1897-98 (indicating that the McDonnell analysis has been termed
the “circumstantial evidence” test, the “indirect” method of proof, the “pretext” method, and the “single
motive” method).
172. See Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 577 (1978).
173. See Katz, supra note 32, at 113 n.15 (providing a sampling of scholarly criticisms).
174. See id. at 178-79 (asserting that the McDonnell Douglas analysis only operates where the
employer’s proffered reason is false or a product of conscious discrimination).
175. See id. at 168 (indicating judges and juries “get so caught up in the mechanics of burden-shifting
and pretext” that they lose sight of the ultimate question). The concurrence in Trott would likely fall
into this category. See Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 28, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J.,
concurring).
176. Wells v. Colo. Dep’t of Transp., 325 F.3d 1205, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (Hartz, J., concurring)
(“To be sure, proof of the prima facie case put the burden on the employer to produce evidence of a
proper motive. But doesn’t the employer almost always do that . . . so what has been accomplished?”).
177. See id. at 1221 (asserting that “the artificiality of the framework exacts a significant,
unnecessary expense—in terms of both wasted judicial effort and greater opportunity for judicial
error.”).
178. Chin & Golinsky, supra note 14, at 660 (“The McDonnell Douglas test . . . actually invites
juries and courts to lose sight of the ultimate issue by focusing their attention away from the existence or
non-existence of discrimination.”).
179. Chin, supra note 34, at 677.
180. See id. at 681 (criticizing plaintiff’s lawyers who do not focus sufficiently on proof of the
ultimate issue of discrimination, and instead rely too heavily on the analysis to do the yeoman’s work of
constructing the case).
181. See Loeb v. Textron, Inc., 600 F.2d 1003, 1014 (1st Cir. 1979) (“Proof of the McDonnell
Douglas-type prima facie case assures the plaintiff his day in court despite the unavailability of direct
evidence . . . .”).
182. See Chin, supra note 34, at 678.
183. Such an approach might entail, “first, evaluating plaintiff’s proof, direct or otherwise, of
discrimination; second evaluating defendant’s proof that it did not discriminate . . . ; and third,
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applied to a paper record, could substantively deprive plaintiffs of the opportunity
to focus the question of causation (before a jury) on the issue of pretext in response
to an employer’s alleged legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for undertaking an
adverse employment action. In the name of simplifying the inquiry from a judge’s
point of view, the burden on the plaintiff would increase and would represent a
shift in the substantive law. Moreover, whereas a traditional prima facie case at
summary judgment requires a plaintiff to demonstrate that she can meet the burden
of production for each element of a claim under the substantive law,184 a “prima
facie case” in the employment discrimination context represents only the first part
of a three-part analysis specifically designed to surface circumstantial evidence of
intentional discrimination. The concurrence in Trott falls victim to the ambiguity
in the phrase “prima facie case,”185 and neglects to consider the substantive law
impact of discarding the requirement that an employer select and assert a
nondiscriminatory reason which the plaintiff can then attempt to show as pretext.186
Thus, first principles of summary judgment, the line of employment discrimination
cases in Maine applying McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment, the fact that
the framework forces the defendant to articulate a nondiscriminatory reason which
the plaintiff can then refute by producing evidence showing a genuine dispute of
material fact, and the familiarity of the analysis among Maine lawyers and judges
all support continued application of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment.187
The Trott majority recognized the criticisms of the analysis and used the
opinion as an opportunity to sharpen the effectiveness of the McDonnell Douglas
inquiry, thereby signaling to lawyers and judges that the burden-shifting analysis is
a valuable interpretive device, when properly applied. The Trott court set forth
three guiding principles that courts should follow when deciding employment
discrimination cases at summary judgment. After determining whether the parties
have complied with the requirements of Rule 56(h)(2), courts should first refrain
from weighing the evidence presented by either side.188 Second, courts should not
engage in credibility determinations at summary judgment because circumstantial

evaluating the evidenced as a whole,” and in the context of summary judgment, resolve “all conflicts in
the proof and drawing all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff.” Chin & Golinsky, supra note
14, at 673.
184. See Trott v. H.D. Goodall Hosp., 2013 ME 33, ¶ 29, 66 A.3d 7 (Silver, J., concurring) (citation
omitted).
185. See id. (asserting that the straightforward inquiry asks whether the undisputed material facts
establish a prima facie cause of action).
186. See McGinley, supra note 36, at 244 (“The McDonnell Douglas/Burdine formula is the
substantive anti-discrimination law.” And, Liberty Lobby requires that courts consider the substantive
law in summary judgment determinations.).
187. Indeed, the approach suggested by the concurrence has been followed in only two other states.
See Curlee v. Kootenai Cnty. Fire & Rescue, 224 P.3d 458, 463 (Idaho 2008) (concluding that while the
burden-shifting analysis is applicable at trial, it should not be applied at summary judgment); Heng v.
Rotech Med. Corp., 688 N.W.2d 389, 401 (N.D. 2004) (stating that McDonnell Douglas has “little or no
application at the summary judgment stage”); Gossett v. Tractor Supply Co., 320 S.W.3d 777, 785
(Tenn. 2010) (holding that “the McDonnell Douglas framework is inapplicable at the summary
judgment stage because it is incompatible with Tennessee summary judgment jurisprudence.”),
superseded by statute, Discrimination-Retaliatory Discharge-Claims, ch. 461, 2011 Tenn. Pub. Acts § 2
(2011) (codified at TENN. CODE ANN. § 50-1-304(g) (West, Westlaw through 2013 legislation)).
188. See Trott, 2013 ME 33, ¶ 19, 66 A.3d 7.
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evidence can give rise to competing inferences.189 Third, courts should clearly
distinguish between “weak” cases of pretext and the absence of any case at all.190
And finally, courts should view the evidence “from the perspective of the full range
of reasonable perceptions of the summary judgment record.”191 In spite of any
potential difficulty in applying McDonnell Douglas, the majority’s final instruction
to view the entirety of the summary judgment record reminds and encourages
lawyers and judges to remain focused on the “ultimate issue.”192
V. CONCLUSION
Few meritorious employment discrimination claims make their way to court,
let alone to trial.193 The Law Court’s articulation of the Trott guiding principles
indicates that the McDonnell Douglas analysis should continue to be applied in
Maine employment discrimination cases facing disposition at summary judgment,
and that the threshold for plaintiffs to survive summary judgment should not be
insurmountable. The analysis supports congressional and judicial policy objectives
aimed at assisting plaintiffs who may be victims of employment discrimination.
Furthermore, continued application of McDonnell Douglas at summary judgment
necessarily targets the inquiry for all parties on the question of pretext. Thus, the
court in Trott implicitly and properly affirmed that the analysis has sustained
application at summary judgment. To hold otherwise would violate first principles
of summary judgment and conflict with broader societal goals of discouraging
employment discrimination.

189. See id. See also McGinley, supra note 36, at 256 (arguing that courts can reconcile the
McDonnell Douglas/Burdine analysis at summary judgment by avoiding “automatically crediting
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191. Id. ¶ 25. See also Me. Human Rights Comm’n v. City of Auburn, 408 A.2d 1253, 1268 (Me.
1979) (cautioning that judges should apply the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the “whole evidence
presented”).
192. See supra notes 164-165 and accompanying text.
193. See Katy Rand, Maine Celebrates 40 Years of Anti-Discrimination Law: A Conversation with
Maine Human Rights Commission Executive Director Patricia Ryan, 26 ME. B.J. 77, 78 (2011)
(“Complaints before the Commission are resolved in basically three ways: approximately one-third are
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